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RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
By 
Gusztáv Nemes PhD. 
 
  Abstract 
 
This paper explores the evolution of rural policies in EU, making some 
comparisons with CEE rurality. In the first chapter I explore some 
theoretical concepts on how policies are transferred from one country to 
another, what a policy paradigm means and how it might change over time 
with special reference to the changing conceptualisation of rural 
development. The rest of the paper is based on literature review; document 
analysis; and interviews and experiences gathered at the European level. In 
the second chapter an account is given of how the modernisation paradigm 
prevalent in EU and CEE rural policies has been eroded during recent 
decades, and what the expression ‘rural development’ might mean for 
various actors and stakeholders of this story. Then I analyse some early 
documents of the SAPARD programme, to show the original intentions of 
EU policy makers at the beginning of the pre-accession preparation. In the 
last chapter I make some conclusions on the EU’s strategy for eastern 
enlargement and its possible implications for the evolution of European 
rural policies.  
Keywords: Development Planning and Policy, Agriculture, Rural Economics, 
Comparative Economic Systems, Agriculture and Natural Resources System 








  VIDÉKFEJLESZTÉSI POLITIKÁK EURÓPÁBAN 
 
  Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmány célja, hogy elemezze az Európai Unió agrár- és vidékpolitikájá-
nak evolúcióját, és párhuzamot vonjon az Európa keleti és nyugati felében az 
elmúlt néhány évtized során végbement fejlődés eredményei között. Az első fe-
jezetben a szakirodalomra támaszkodva bemutatjuk, hogy a különféle politikák 
és fejlesztési programok (vagyis a gazdasági, társadalomi folyamatokba való 
állami beavatkozás bizonyos eszközei) hogyan ültethetők át az egyik államból a 
másikba (policy transition), mit jelent a paradigma (policy paradigm) és a pa-
radigmaváltás, illetve milyen következményekkel járhat mindez a vidékpolitika 
területén. A tanulmány további részében a szakirodalom mellett különböző do-
kumentumok elemzésére, a kutatás során a magyar államigazgatásban illetve 
az EU különböző intézményeiben készített interjúkra, az akciókutatás illetve a 
résztvevő megfigyelés során gyűjtött tapasztalatokra is támaszkodtam. A má-
sodik fejezet azt elemzi, hogy az agrár- és vidékpolitikában sokáig egyedural-
kodó ’modernizációs paradigma’ hogyan indult bomlásnak az utóbbi évtize-
dekben, és hogy a ’vidékfejlesztés’ kifejezés a különböző szereplők számára mi-
lyen jelentéssel bírhat. A harmadik fejezetben az EU SAPARD program néhány 
korai (1998-2000-ből származó), az EU Bizottság által kiadott dokumentumát 
elemezzük azzal a céllal, hogy rávilágítsunk az EU-nak az előcsatlakozási 
programokkal kapcsolatos kezdeti szándékaira. Végül az utolsó fejezetben le-
vonunk néhány következtetést a keleti bővítéssel kapcsolatos uniós stratégiával 








With the shifting of the cultural and socio-economic environment, policies and 
theoretical thinking about rural development have been continuously changing over 
time. Rural development, therefore, is an opaque concept used by various interests with 
different meanings. No agreement exists as to what development as a process, as a goal 
or as an achievement is, or what should be considered 'special' about rural development, 
as opposed to other types of development (Buller and Wright 1990). For the past thirty 
years rural development as an academic and a political subject or as the ‘life of everyday 
rural people’ has held many different meanings. Earlier approaches started from the 
modernisation paradigm, trying to modernise all aspects of rural life: agricultural 
production, social structures, culture and physical infrastructure. Rationalisation, 
intensification and economic growth were important aims thought to be achieved mainly 
through external intervention. As significant drawbacks of modernisation and external 
intervention became obvious, an endogenous and sometimes preservationist approach 
towards development started to emerge. This operated with a different set of principles 
building on local resources and participation, ‘process type aims’, traditional values, and 
so on. This approach worked to counter many earlier problems; however, it could 
commit whole areas into low development trajectories.  
At the end of the last millennium, emerging socio-economic changes in the countryside 
could no longer be understood within the old paradigm. The rural economy, employment 
issues and the aims and circumstances of agricultural production all changed 
considerably. Therefore, a new rural development paradigm started to take shape, trying 
to explain current socio-economic changes of the European countryside. It draws 
together various scientific concepts and operates with old and new ideas, such as 
networks, institutions, control, development repertoires and ‘repeasantization’. 
Nevertheless, the new paradigm is based on practical examples, rather than theoretical 
thinking, and it is still being formulated (van der Ploeg et al 2000).  
The following review does not intend to be an exhaustive one, although it tries to 
achieve various aims. First I shortly review the literature on the notions of the transition 
of public policies and the possibility of a paradigm shift in the policy making process. 
These concepts will be employed throughout the thesis when I analyse rural policies of 
the EU, of CEE (Central and Eastern European) countries and/or particular development 
                                                 
1 The paper is based on previous research (PhD and post-doctoral), done between 1998-2005, and was 
supported by the following donors:  
Phare ACE Fellowship – CRE - University of Newcastle;  
OSI International Policy Fellowship;  
Marie Curie Individual Research Fellowship (HPMF-CT-2002-02168), Department of Geography – 
University of Valencia.  
I would like to thank my tutors for all their help, the people I interviewed for their patience and time 
and my wife, Zsuzsanna Fazekas, for her encouragement and hard labour with my manuscript. 
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programmes. Then some of the most important rural socio-economic changes and 
connected theoretical concepts of the last decades will be explored, and comparisons 
between Western and Eastern European countryside will be drawn. Rural policies can be 
pro-active, can go hand-in-hand with socio-economic changes of the countryside, but 
can also give late or inadequate answers to these. In this section I also intend to show 
some important contradictions within the EU rural policy system and to summarise those 
various meanings in which ‘rural development’ is used in the vocabulary of EU policy 
making. The following section examines the intention of EU policy makers whether to 
change or to reinforce the old paradigm in connection with eastern enlargement, through 
the analysis of the SAPARD
2 regulation.  Finally I try to make some conclusions on the 
EU pre-accession policies and their possible effects on the evolution of the ongoing re-
form of European agricultural and rural policies. 
 
1.  SHIFTING THE POLICY PARADIGM, TRANSFERRING PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
The literature on the development and transfer of public policies is large. The following 
draws upon key articles, picking up ideas, approaches and a vocabulary, important for 
the subsequent analysis.  
In their review article, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996:344) define policy transfer as "a 
process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place". This seems to be a good, 
widely accepted working definition for the subject. However, there is some confusion 
concerning those policies introduced within an international organisation - such as the 
EU or the WTO - and disseminated throughout all participating countries. Should these 
sorts of policies be classified as policy transfer or not? Another definition by Stone 
(1999:53) provides an answer in  saying that: "policy transfer occurs at the sub-national 
level; between states in federal systems and across local governments, municipalities 
and boroughs. Policies sometimes develop from particular local practices - either 
through pilot schemes or the innovations of street level bureaucrats - and are transferred 
to other local areas or settings".  
A usual approach to policy transfer is a pluralist one saying that it brings new ideas to 
inward looking states and bureaucracies and opens up possibilities for change. However, 
as Dolowitz and Marsh argue (1996:355, 356) "if policy transfer occurs within relatively 
closed international policy communities, instead of introducing new ideas, lesson 
drawing simply reinforces the existing system, ... maintaining the status quo". They 
continue stating that: "policy making is not inevitably, or perhaps even usually, a 
rational process. Rather, it is often a messy process in which different policy, solution, 
                                                 
2 SAPARD: Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development. 
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and problem streams need to combine at the appropriate moment for a policy to 
develop". Factors such as political conflicts, lobbying power, the dysfunction of 
bureaucracy and the ruling policy paradigm have a great influence on the process. 
Important factors, discussed by the literature are: 'who transfers the policy' and 'what is 
transferred' (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). The main agents of policy transfer are: elected 
officials; political parties; bureaucrats; pressure groups; experts; supra-national 
organisations; NGOs; academics; and even entrepreneurs. The objects of policy transfer 
can be: policy goals; administrative techniques; institutions; ideology or justifications; 
attitudes and ideas; approaches and philosophies; and negative lessons. The most 
important factors constraining policy transfer are: the complexity of the policy; the 
transferring agency; and the institutions, political culture and financial resources of the 
transferring country. The more complex a policy, the more difficult it is to transfer and 
the more likely the transfer will end in failure. Rose (1993), for example, suggests six 
factors of complexity for examination: 1) programmes with single goals are more 
transferable than programmes with multiple goals; 2) the simpler the problem the more 
likely transfer will occur; 3) the more direct the relationship between the problem and 
the solution, the more likely it is to be transferable; 4) the fewer the perceived side-
effects of a policy the greater the possibility of transfer; 5) the more information agents 
have about how a programme operates in another location the easier it is to transfer; 6) 
the more easily outcomes can be predicted the simpler a programme is to transfer.  
Another topic to be examined is the nature of policy transfer. The literature identifies 
two basic types. The first is called hard (Stone 1999) or coercive (Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996) transfer, or by others instrumental learning (Stone 1999) or legitimation (Bennett 
1997). In this type, legislation, standard procedures, bureaucracies, rules and regulations 
are transferred from one place (one country) to another, mainly by centrally controlled 
bureaucratic institutions. The policy transfer is compulsory; local actors are usually 
obliged to comply with new regulations but are also entitled to aid and benefits, 
delivered by the policy. A clear example for this type is the enlargement of international 
organisations (EU, OECD, WTO, NATO, etc.). Here new member states are obliged to 
accept the whole body of regulations existing in the mother organisation (in the case of 
EU enlargement this is the acquis communautaire). The other type is called variably soft 
or voluntary transfer, social learning or harmonisation by the above authors. In this case 
it is not simply bureaucratic institutions and legislations that are transferred, but 
approaches, development philosophy, broad policy ideas, new technologies or 
management techniques. Rather than the government bureaucracy, the main agents of 
the transfer are civil organisations, academics, NGOs and entrepreneurs. The whole 
process is somewhat ‘softer’ and more difficult to follow than in the case of hard 
transfers. However, consequences can be deep and far-reaching and as a result, new 
approaches can become an inherent part of official policies. Examples could be the 
environmental movement, organic agricultural production or various forms of customer 
protection.  
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A study written by Hall (1993) concentrates on a somewhat different understanding of 
social learning and explores the change of policy paradigms, rather than their transfer 
between countries. Hall suggests that: "policymakers work within a framework of ideas 
and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing. Like Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through 
which policymakers communicate about their work..." (1993:279). He calls this 
framework a policy paradigm and takes advantage of Thomas Kuhn's analogy on 
scientific paradigms to explain the learning process in public policies. Hall distinguishes 
first, second and third order changes in policymaking. First and second order changes 
are the results of 'normal policy development', usually responding to policy failures 
rather than simply the challenge of emerging problems. These changes can bring in new 
policies, new objectives and ideologies, but do not change the policy paradigm. They are 
usually most strongly advocated by experts and the civil servants who have to operate 
and implement the policies, in other words they are the results of the autonomous action 
of the state.  
Third order changes involve the significant alteration of basic principles and could be 
considered as a shift of the policy paradigm
3. They respond to the changing 
circumstances and 'anomalies' that are impossible to deal with through the old paradigm 
and hence have resulted in repeated policy failures. According to Hall, in a typical case a 
third order change is initiated by external advocates, who need to have a well-developed 
alternative policy paradigm to replace the old dysfunctional one. Technical questions 
previously handled within the ruling administrative system become the subject of public 
debate. The paradigm shift occurs backed by political transition (change of government 
and bureaucrats) and is driven by overwhelming political authority, rather than 
expertise.  
The above models are important for the applied argument, since they help to understand 
the nature of policy changes and how policy transfer as an influential external factor can 
have significant effects on the policy development of individual countries.   
 
2.  THE  ‘MODERNISATION PARADIGM’ AND THE EVOLUTION OF RURAL 
POLICIES IN EUROPE 
 
Until recent years, the prevailing policy paradigm in rural development was the 
exogenous model, with modernisation as its ruling concept. The basic notion here is that 
rural areas are lagging behind urban centres. The main reasons for their backwardness 
are physical remoteness, low accessibility, and the traditionalism of socio-economic and 
                                                 
3 Hall's example for third order change is the fundamental transformation of British economic policies 
from the Keynesian to the monetarist paradigm, which gained place with the victory of Margaret 
Thatcher in the 1979 elections. 
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cultural systems. As indicated by this approach, to improve the situation, these areas 
have to be modernised and connected to dynamic centres and expanding sectors. All this 
can be achieved through central interventions. According to Stöhr (1986), during the 
“upswing” phase of the Kondratieff cycle after World War II regional policies in general 
applied an uniform model of development as quantitative growth, predominantly 
characterised by mobility and capital, “creaming” regional resources and exporting 
bottlenecks and adjustment problems to peripheral regions and countries.  
According to Lowe et al (1998:8) the basic attributes of exogenous model of rural 
development are as follows: 
•  Key principle - economies of scale; 
•  Dynamic force - urban growth poles. The main forces of development conceived as 
emanating from outside rural areas;  
•  Function of rural areas - food and other primary production for the expanding urban 
economy; 
•  Major rural development problems - low productivity and peripherality; 
•  Focus of rural development - agricultural industrialisation and specialisation, encour-
agement of labour and capital mobility; 
These features characterise exogenous development in general. Nevertheless, within this 
model, several subsequent waves of approaches and policies can be differentiated with 
diverse objectives and measures. I distinguish three of them here: agricultural and 
agricultural structural policies; rural industrial and regional development policies; 
spatially designed 'top-down' policies. The first two of these labels refer to the changing 
emphasis between agricultural and regional development policies, the two main 
approaches to exogenous, sectoral rural development. The third one refers to the more 
recent development of a spatial or territorial approach of rural policies, which integrates 
previous sectoral policies in order to achieve the development of a particular spatial 
area. These different waves of exogenous development represent an evolutionary 
process, but they are also implemented in parallel. The rest of this section explores those 
more recent developments of EU policy making, which have tried to give an answer to 
the problems arising from modernisation during the last decade, from the introduction of 
the LEADER programme to the promises and observable effects of the Agenda 2000. 
 
2.1. AGRICULTURAL AND AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURAL POLICIES 
 
According to classical political economy of agriculture (Marsden et al 1990), the social 
and economic functions of rural areas have changed significantly as a consequence of 
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the mutually reinforcing processes of modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation. 
During the post War 'boom period' of European economies, for example, the available 
capital and labour force together with industrial and commercial activities increasingly 
concentrated around major cities and industrial areas of Europe. This resulted in the 
practice of commuting and/or the migration of population from rural to urban locations, 
providing the labour force necessary to fuel the rapid development of Fordist industrial 
hegemony (Bryden 2001). Traditional peasant life and culture was seen as an obstacle to 
improvements. Modernisation and ‘depeasantisation’ became parallel concepts (Giner, 
Sevilla Guzman 1980:15-16). Within spatially polarised but nationally integrated 
geographies rural economies became specialised and homogenised; small-scale 
industries and other economic activities were virtually removed from many areas. In this 
development trajectory the spatial category of rural was often viewed as residual to 
urban (Saraceno 1994) and "the function of rural areas, stripped of other economic 
activities, was to provide food for the expanding cities" (Lowe, Murdoch and Ward 
1995: 89).  
The first wave of post war 'rural development' philosophies and subsequent policy 
making was derived from the aim of the reinforcement of this process in those countries 
and areas, where 'too many people remained on the land'. Development problems of 
rural areas were understood in terms of peripherality or remoteness, low productivity of 
primary sectors and the physical exclusion of rural people from urban jobs and services, 
diminishing their standard of living. The overall aim was modernisation of the rural 
economy and society, through connecting backward regions to dynamic centres and 
expanding sectors in addition to encouraging the transfer of progressive models, 
technologies and practices into rural areas. To achieve these aims, the first wave of 
centrally designed and implemented exogenous  policies was introduced (Lowe et al 
1998). The main objectives were: intensification of agricultural production; the 
development of farm-oriented agriculture; consolidating farm-structures; and the 
encouragement of capital and labour mobility towards industrial areas (Lowe 1999).  
Although social and economic circumstances as well as applied policies were 
significantly different in Western and Eastern European (or capitalist and socialist) 
countries, results show many similarities.  
In  Western European democracies the process was influenced mainly through the 
market, subsidies for technological change and the welfare system. After World War II 
the main aims of agricultural policies was to ensure a sufficient domestic food supply 
and maintain farmers’ livelihoods. This was thought to be achieved through progressive 
price subsidies ('the more you produce, the more money you get'); development of 
market institutions and support of voluntary co-operation (first agricultural structural 
policies). The image of the 'hard working farmer', as the manifestation of 'protestant 
ethics' and capitalist entrepreneurship prevailed until recently, having an important 
effect on the process (Ward 1998). The philosophy behind most introduced policies was 
the support of family farms. However, paradoxically they resulted in the acceleration of 
the outflow of labour from agriculture and the disappearance of many of these family 
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businesses (Commins 1997). Within the European Community a Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) was introduced and the European Guarantee and Guidance Fund 
(EAGGF) was set up. Financial resources were provided for agricultural entrepreneurs 
through price support and for "structural modifications
4 required for the proper working 
of the common market" (Commission 1997/2). Besides agricultural policies the general 
support for the industrialisation of core regions and the development of the welfare state 
(especially urban social housing) also had a significant effect on the economic and social 
restructuring of rural space. The subsequent development resulted in a capital-intensive 
agriculture, which was less dependent on nature and required much less human labour. 
Family farms remained the predominant form of agricultural production. However, as a 
result of modernisation these families produced more and used larger areas, therefore, 
the number of farms and size of the agricultural workforce fell inexorably. All of this 
resulted in an increasing migration of the population towards industrial areas. 
In the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) similar results were 
attained through the very different instruments of planned economy, restrictive rules and 
political dictatorship. Here the existence of independent farmers meant a major 
impediment in the way of the creation of a centrally controlled socialist society and 
economy
5. In most CEE countries the first major step was therefore the forcible 
confiscation of land and other agricultural means of production from the peasantry, 
referred to as 'socialist collectivisation'. An official economic justification of the process 
was built on rationalisation and the theory of economies of scale, but the political aim 
was the centralisation of every area of life. In most CEE countries large agricultural 
holdings were created and many peasants were driven out of farming. Political goals, at 
least at the beginning, were more important than economic ones: yields and overall 
production suffered significant falls during the first years of collectivisation. However, 
subsequent, centrally driven programmes aiming at the intensification of agricultural 
production were carried out. The result was a very large scale, capital-intensive 
agriculture, run in hierarchical systems, which, paradoxically to the justification of the 
economies of scale, was less efficient and employed significantly more people than its 
Western counterpart in the long term. Nevertheless, through political pressure for 
intensification, the number of people employed in agriculture fell steadily. This, 
similarly to Western countries, ensured the manpower for the forced development of 
heavy industries from the 1950s onwards (Nemes 1999).  
In CEE countries there were significant differences in the resulting patterns of 
population changes compared to the Western European countries. In most CEE regions 
the welfare state was not strong enough to provide sufficient housing and other essential 
services for a sufficient number of workers within industrial areas. Many rural people 
were squeezed out of rural labour market, but were not able to move into the developing 
                                                 
4 Such as agricultural structural policies for consolidation farm structures, land improvement schemes, 
development of farm orientated infrastructures, subsidies and loans for mechanisation and introduction 
of more advanced methods of production, etc. (Lowe et al. 1998) 
5 A frequently quoted phrase of Lenin was: 'Capitalism is reproduced by private property every day'. 
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centres (Szelényi and Konrád 1971). Beside migration tendencies, a culture of large 
scale industrial commuting from rural to industrial areas was taking shape, having far 
reaching consequences for the future economic and social patterns of rurality. Another 
significant difference occurred in the intensification of agricultural production, which, as 
a result of poorer capital investment, reached a much lower level in most CEE regions. 
This had important consequences for the economic and social structure, as well as for 
the natural environment. Less intensified agricultural areas usually preserved more 
traditional values (production methods, way of life, culture, etc.), more agricultural 
employment and more natural and cultural diversity in general
6.  
 
2.2. RURAL INDUSTRIAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
 
As it soon became apparent, agricultural restructuring alone could not stabilise rural 
economies and rural populations. Indeed, they seemed to intensify the flow of labour out 
of agriculture and often out of the rural areas altogether, causing concern for the 
viability of rural regions. The depopulation of peripheral areas and the balanced 
development of national territory became preoccupations of rural policy in Europe. 
Consequently, in addition to continued agricultural support, rural infrastructural and 
regional development policies, focusing on peripheral regions were introduced. Main 
aims were attracting new types of employment into rural areas and building the 
necessary infrastructure to accommodate industrial production in the countryside.  
In most Western European countries manufacturing companies, encouraged by both 
government policies and cheap labour, were relocating from urban to rural areas, or 
opening branch plants. Development agencies were set up to provide financial support, 
programmes to improve infrastructure, including transport systems, communication lines 
and the provision of serviced factory sites (Lowe et al 1998). However, this process (in 
Britain, for example) was accompanied by an attempt at rationalising the settlement 
system in order to reduce the costs of running physical and social infrastructure in 
remote, scattered areas (Buller and Wright 1990). A so called rural 'branch plant 
economy' emerged and was strengthened, especially in France, Italy, Ireland and the 
UK. At the same time in the Mediterranean countries and some remote areas of Europe, 
the emerging 'tourism industry' had a similar effect on the rural economy. A change of 
development philosophy within agricultural policies could also be encountered 
(Marsden et al 1990). Following the 'Mansholt Plan' (1968) and the British accession 
negotiations in the early 1970s; a regional differentiation with measures for the less-
favoured areas (LFAs) was introduced. This policy aimed to protect farmers and special 
farming practices of backward and disadvantageous regions, and, at the same time, it 
was the first rural policy of the EU that targeted particular spatial areas.  
                                                 
6 This, besides Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), also occurred in many less favoured 
areas (LFAs) of Western Europe. 
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A new Council regulation on financing the CAP was also introduced (1970) which 
placed a greater emphasis on the process of adapting agricultural structures. Then the 
1980’s brought a new regulatory framework of EU structural policies up to the reform of 
the Structural Funds in 1988 (Commission 1997/2). In most European regions, 
agriculture became a marginal employer giving space to manufacturing, light industries 
and increasingly to tourism and burgeoning service industries. Pluriactivity became a 
more widespread phenomenon amongst those who could no longer live on farming alone 
and had access to the wider labour market. These 'withdrawing' part-time farmers 
generally continued the same style of production, albeit on a smaller scale and in a less 
intensive manner, compared to their full-time counterparts.  
In some Central and Eastern European countries a parallel process brought somewhat 
similar results. In Hungary, for example, from the late 1960s intensive programmes 
aiming at agricultural modernisation were carried out. Advanced production methods 
were introduced, previously independent co-operatives were merged and large-scale 
mechanisation was undertaken
7. This resulted in a further decline in demand for 
agricultural labour, but agricultural co-operatives had a political obligation to provide 
local employment. From the mid-1970s many of them established industrial enterprises, 
so-called 'industrial sidelines' for raising employment, using free capacities and securing 
cash flow for agricultural production. These industrial units worked mainly in 
processing or light industries, often as branch plants of big factories from industrial 
centres. Although the technical equipment and production methods used were usually 
outdated, as a result of cheap labour and favourable regulations these small plants could 
flourish and they introduced industry to many rural areas. By the early 1980s most rural 
towns and larger villages had some sort of industrial production, although with 
significant regional differences (Nemes Nagy 2001). Employment patterns had changed 
from agriculture towards industry irreversibly and industrial commuting became a 
fundamental characteristic of the rural economy. Nevertheless, 'counterurbanisation' as 
experienced in Western countries, was almost totally lacking. During the same period 
major investments in rural infrastructure and transport systems were also undertaken. 
However, some remote areas were almost omitted from these improvements. Similarly 
to Britain, several attempts to rationalise the settlement system in scattered, remote areas 
were made by the central government, reinforcing the abandonment of the most 
disadvantaged areas and settlements (Nemes 1999).  
 
2.3. THE FAILURE AND THE ‘ESCAPE’ OF THE CAP 
 
The 1980s brought a significant change in thinking and philosophies about rural 
development in the EU. By the late 1970s the exogenous model was falling into 
                                                 
7 Between the early 1960s and the early 1980s all of this resulted in a rapid 2-3-fold increase in yields, 
thus approaching or actually reaching the standards of developed countries. 
  11 
disrepute, the insufficiency of agricultural and other sectoral policies in treating 
problems of backward areas became apparent. It has become clear that the global 
conditions which dominated the post-war period were changing, and the basic 
assumptions of traditional regional development policies have become invalid. “Besides 
reduced growth rates, increasing energy and mobility costs, and reduction in the 
availability of public funds, one consequence of global change was the disappearance of 
ecological, economic, and political free spaces.” It became clear that the displacement of 
bottlenecks and costs of development to peripheral areas cannot take place indefinitely 
and core regions had to find internal solutions for their problems (Stöhr, 1986, p. 65).  
Results of externally driven rural development policies turned out to be highly 
vulnerable to global economic and political forces. The recession of the early 1980s 
resulted in the closure of much of the 'rural branch plant economy' developed in previous 
decades (Lowe, Murdoch and Ward 1995). At the same time, economic recession greatly 
diminished the capacity of the urban sector to absorb the surplus rural population. 
Mistaken directions of post war agricultural policies and development also became 
obvious. The aim was not further intensification any more, but rather reduction of 
surplus agricultural production. All these resulted in rural unemployment and/or 
depopulation in certain areas. Extensive environmental damage, caused by industrial 
agriculture was also recognised, as green and ecological movements emerged all over 
Europe (Holzinger and Knoepfel 2000). At the same time, in many regions of Western 
Europe, society was being reshaped by an extending counterurbanisation; providing 
living space for urban migrants became a major purpose for many rural settlements 
(Murdoch and Marsden 1994). Newcomers, compared to locals, often had different or 
even contrasting preferences concerning the objectives of development and preservation. 
Counterurbanisation, therefore, brought both new resources and new sources of conflicts 
to rural localities. 
Rural development theorists interpreted this period as an era of fundamental socio-
economic changes and labelled it as rural restructuring (Marsden et al 1993, Murdoch 
and Marsden 1994). Many UK researchers tried to answer the questions: ‘why do people 
move to the countryside? (Marsden et al 1993, Cloke 1994, Murdoch 1997). They found 
that though some poor people had moved to villages to find a cheaper living, the major 
source of migration was the prosperous  urban population. They came for landscape, 
tranquillity, a more traditional way of life and other values. This, together with the 
growing importance of rural tourism, forecasted a fundamental change of the functions 
of rural space and economy. Marsden at al (1993) at the same time classified four types 
of rural areas (preserved, contested, paternalistic and clientelistic) according to the 
development of their social structure, contact with urban centres and relations to primary 
production or more novel types of rural economic activities.  
Significant changes in rural economy and society had to be reflected by EU policy 
makers. The most burning problems in the mid-late 1980s were cutting the growth of 
surplus agricultural production; and to achieve price stability; to avoid unmanageable 
financial difficulties of the Community budget. This was partly achieved through quotas, 
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set aside and setting a ceiling to the growth of agricultural budget by the late 1980s. 
Nevertheless, a growing sense of environmental damage, social costs, dwindling 
agricultural employment and external forces (such as subsequent rounds of the GATT 
negotiations) required policy makers to apply significant changes to agricultural 
policies. In 1992, however, a proposal to conduct an overall reform to CAP (McSharry 
reform) could be implemented only in a ‘rather diluted’ form due to a resistance from 
agricultural lobbies and some member states. According to many critiques, a very 
similar process would be followed in connection with reforms under Agenda 2000. 
Consequently, studying the successive reforms of the CAP one could say that a 
'paradigm shift' still has not occurred in the field of agricultural policies. In spite of the 
changing circumstances and growing pressures the CAP has been able to 'escape' 
through first and second order changes. When old measures failed to meet new 
circumstances, reform proposals were originated from within the EU bureaucracy (a 
distinct characteristic of first and second order changes) and were watered down, rather 
than reinforced by external forces (conservative economic and political lobbies). 
Rhetoric, objectives, policy instruments, support mechanisms were changed, however, 
basic principles (competitiveness, intensive production) and the very unequal division of 
the subsidies amongst farmers were practically untouched
8. Farmers were compensated 
for the termination of previous market supports. Most negotiated changes were 
consequences of liabilities taken up during the ongoing trade talks with the WTO 
(World Trade Organisation) and requirements to maintain cash-flow in the EU budget, 
and had no impact on the fundamentals of the philosophy of the programme (Ritson and 
Harvey 1997). The core of supports, maybe under a different denomination, continued 
serving the interests of industrial agricultural production, causing further damage to rural 
environment and society.  
 
2.4. SPATIALLY DESIGNED 'TOP-DOWN' APPROACH 
 
During the 1980s unfavourable tendencies appeared regarding regional differences 
within the European Community. A slow convergence that had characterised the 
previous period among the countries and regions of Europe ended and inter-regional 
differences rose again to a level that used to exist before the 1970s (Amin and Tomaney 
1995). The first attempt to approach this spatially defined problem through the regional 
concentration of resources was the introduction of a pilot scheme called ‘three integrated 
programmes’ (Commission 1997/2) in 1981 to support some backward areas in 
Scotland, France and Belgium. The next step was the accession of the southern countries 
of Europe. It was the first enlargement in which large underdeveloped areas and a 
                                                 
8 According to the so-called 80-20 rule of the CAP, 80% of agricultural support benefits the 20% of 
producers having the largest and most intensive farms, with the highest yields, located in the most 
favourable agricultural regions of the Community (Kola 1999:33). 
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sizable poor population was granted admittance to the Community, compared to its 
former membership. Consequently, regional inequalities grew significantly, which gave 
further importance to regional policies. The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, 
introduced to handle the arising problems, expressly endeavoured to reach a complex 
economical, social and environmental balance of rural parts (Commission 1997/2).  
In accordance with the new directives announced in the first ‘Delors Package’ by the 
European Commission (Commission 1997/2), economic and social cohesion as well as 
reduction of regional differences within the EU became a primary object in order to 
establish a ‘unified internal market’. As a corollary of that, the Structural Funds 
underwent dramatic reforms and the regional approach became more robust within 
development policy. The above-mentioned Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 
served as pilot programmes for structural reforms. The budget for the Structural Funds 
was doubled and the fields in need for support were classified into groups (or 
‘Objectives’ in the EU terminology) on the basis of the nature of the problem. As far as 
rural development was concerned, priority was given to Objective 1, 5b, and later 6 after 
the accession of Nordic countries. By 1999, Structural and Cohesion Policies covered 
nearly three-quarters of the EU area and almost 35% of the population of the Union 
(Commission 1997/2). 
The question can be raised: was this process a paradigm shift, or rather should it be 
considered as a second order change? Overall, Structural Policies represent a very 
significant transformation compared to previous policies of the EU. A whole set of new 
institutions and policy instruments was set up, new objectives and funding methods 
introduced, and a new ideological framework created. The main reason for these 
alterations was the serious changes in the economic and political circumstances and the 
‘external pressure’ of the southern enlargement. These could well be the signs of a shift 
of the policy paradigm. However, there are opposite indications too. The new system 
supplemented the old paradigm, rather than replaced it; new policies and institutions 
were initiated and designed from within the existing bureaucratic system and network of 
experts. Besides, the style of policy making has not changed significantly. Most 
territorial policies, introduced under the reformed Structural Funds remained exogenous 
in nature. They were spatially designed and had certain elements of a 'bottom-up' 
approach
9; however, they mainly implemented previous exogenous regional 
development and agricultural structural policies, within a territorially focused 
framework (Lowe et al 1995).  
As it has been argued by Amin (1993) and by Amin and Tomaney (1995) structural 
policies also failed to achieve the cohesion of different areas of the EU. A main reason 
for this, as they say, was the inadequacy of the financial resources, provided by the 
policies. Under the reformed Structural Funds only 0.24% of the GDP of the EU was 
redistributed, which was not enough "to cope with the huge productivity gap between 
the core regions and the large number of less favoured areas" (Amin & Tomaney 
                                                 
9 Such as partnership and additionality, for example. 
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1995:13). As they argue, there is not much chance for a fundamental change of this 
figure. This was shown, for example, by the resistance of the member states to ratify the 
so-called 'Delors II package' in 1992, which aimed to increase expenditure on cohesion. 
Therefore, the very basic principles of the policy paradigm - such as its top-down, 
centralised nature and its orientation towards global competitiveness - were not 
challenged by the new system. Thus, within the given framework of analysis (Hall 
1993), the development of the Structural Policies as a second order change, which fits 
into the processes of 'usual policy evolution" rather than representing a paradigm shift.  
A certain erosion of the ruling policy paradigm had started, however. The most apparent 
signs of this could be found in the new reforms and the rural development rhetoric. 
Political documents and speeches (CEC 1988, Franz Fischler’s speeches on DG VI 
website) began to urge the application of a more complex approach to problems, 
emphasising a ‘rural preference’ instead of ‘agricultural preference’ specified in the 
Treaty of Rome. The condition of ‘sustainability’ and a need for an integrated, spatial 
approach instead of supporting economic sectors spread gradually. The European 
Commission set out forward-looking objectives in a green paper entitled ‘The Future of 
Rural Society’ (CEC 1988). This served later as the basis for reform initiatives and new 
trends in rural development. In parallel to that a pilot project called LEADER (Liaisons 
Entre Actions de Développement de l'Economie Rurale) was introduced in 1991 in order 
to apply bottom-up rural development models building on the internal resources of local 
communities. 
 
2.5. THE LEADER PROGRAMME 
 
LEADER was launched with a very modest budget in 1991. Owing to its experimental 
status the rules and the control of the entire programme was rather loose, giving space 
for innovation and local initiatives. "It was defined by the European Commission more 
as a set of principles than through pre-ordained, technocratic, sectoral measures" (Ray 
1997:3). The main preferences were: invention of new, innovative and transferable ideas 
in rural development; small scale local development activities based on participation, 
community involvement, partnership and use of local resources; building up a cross-
regional or trans-national network of local initiatives (for details see Ray, Curtin, 
Shucksmith, Storey and others). According to Shortall and Shucksmith (1998:8): "The 
LEADER programme viewed local people as the principal asset of rural areas, and the 
distinctive characteristic of LEADER projects was the reliance placed on the people who 
live in rural areas, and on their ability to discover what was best suited to their 
environment, culture, working traditions and skills". The programme was also intended 
to have a multiplier effect in the sense that "the activities of a project should generate 
outcomes and benefits which extend beyond the area of operation of the project, or 
beyond its allotted time-frame" (Commins 1997:70).  
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Another important characteristic of this approach is that the process whereby a local 
community achieves its aims is no less important, from the viewpoint of development, 
than the targeted objectives themselves. As Kearney, Boyle and Welsh (1995:22) point 
out: "Development is not simply a question of undertaking projects, nor achieving 
objectives specified in narrow economic terms. Development is also a process, by which 
is meant the creation of local products such as upgraded local leadership, a culture of 
enterprise and innovative action, or the enhanced capacity of people to act in concert, 
purposefully and effectively.... It involves enabling communities to have greater control 
over their relationships with the environment and other communities. Essentially it 
involves empowering communities to have greater influence on their own 
development...". 
As a result of loosely determined principles and goals, many interpretations of the 
LEADER approach came into being and the first round of the programme ended in 
‘anarchic development’ (Ray, 1997/1). The final outcome was influenced not only by 
local, economic, social, geographical, organisational, cultural and ethnic conditions, but 
often other incidental conditions such as the personality, skills and social relations of the 
central co-ordinator or the local manager. In some cases LEADER meant just another 
financial opportunity up the sleeves of local political and economic leaders. 
Nevertheless, in other examples it succeeded far beyond its financial importance and 
restructured the local society and economy by applying treatment at the root of the 
problems.  
The second round of the programme (1994-1999) applied very similar principles, albeit 
with significant changes in implementation. In terms of the number of projects, the ove-
rall budget and the territorial coverage LEADER II was some four times larger than the 
prototype. The order of priorities also changed, a greater emphasis was placed on 
international co-operation and environmental protection. The growth in magnitude and 
budget entailed more formal rules, institutional background and tighter control, which 
greatly reduced the experimental and innovative nature of the programme. 
Transparency, transferability of models and administration became more important. On 
the other hand, carefully considered strategies, interregional and international co-
operation and the reinforcement of various ‘process type’ community goals brought a 
number of positive results. 
The LEADER programme itself could well be understood as a radical divorce from 
modernisation, or a shift of the earlier policy paradigm. Although it was originated from 
within the bureaucratic system, it took a route, which was almost the opposite of the 
usual policy practice. New institutions and procedures were built, separately from the 
traditional bureaucratic system, employing what has been referred to as “reflexive 
practitioners” (see Ray 1999). The bottom-up approach was a widely referenced 
development philosophy, alternative to the earlier paradigm, and LEADER was an 
experiment to answer failures of earlier policies and fill the new development approach 
with content in a European environment. It was backed by various political forces and 
significantly contributed to the reinforcement (and partly the emergence) of a ‘third 
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way’ development lobby
10. It was also endured by the old paradigm, since it proved to 
be a rather economical way of helping rural areas and had an ‘experimental budget’ 
only.  
Many have criticised both rounds of the programme. Nevertheless, the majority of 
experts agree that the LEADER Programme was a success (see Fischler 1997/2, Ray, 
1996, 1997, 1997/1, 1998, Curtin et al 1996, Mernagh and Commins 1997, Shortall and 
Shucksmith 1998). Its significance for those involved goes far beyond the share it 
received from the Structural Funds or the anticipated results it had been expected to 
achieve. LEADER I and II generated enormous enthusiasm and introduced the bottom-
up approach into the minds of bureaucrats and politicians and into everyday practice of 
European rural development. It also played a vital role in establishing a trans-national 
network of regions, which appeared on the EU’s political palette as a fresh, strong lobby 
to promote backward regions and endogenous rural development.  
This success of bottom-up development, according to commentators, should have 
justified LEADER becoming a core instrument in its own right, or through the 
fundamental integration of its philosophy into major structural and rural policies
11.  This 
could have been a logical step, similar to what had happened in the case of Structural 
and Cohesion Policies in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, such a change has not occurred 
under Agenda 2000 and is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future either. A 
paradigm shift has not taken place in EU policy making as a whole, thus LEADER and 
the bottom-up approach have remained a somewhat alien body in the ruling system. On 
a rhetorical level the ‘new paradigm’ has become part of the official language and some 
changes have occurred in bureaucratic institutions and procedures, especially in 
Structural Policies. However, basic principles have not changed and LEADER, instead 
of entailing a paradigm shift, has gradually become a somewhat modified version of the 
old paradigm, through its increasing dilution during subsequent rounds of the 
programme. 
Nevertheless, LEADER contributed significantly to the erosion of the modernisation 
paradigm. It showed the possibility of an alternative way in practice; reinforced regional 
identities, created a trans-national network of small localities and made a contribution to 
the building of a coherent policy paradigm, alternative to the ruling system.  
 
2.6. THE CORK DECLARATION 
 
After the launch of LEADER, the next significant step in building a new paradigm for 
rural policies was initiated by Franz Fischler, the next Agricultural Commissioner, with 
                                                 
10 Today this is embodied in the Committee of the Regions, the European wide network of LEADER 
groups and others. 
11 "Rural development must be local and community-driven within a coherent European framework, 
building on the pilot LEADER programme" (Shortall and Shucksmith 1998). 
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a European agricultural strategy paper (CEC 1995); a Conference in Cork, held in 1996, 
and the resulting declaration published in conclusion.  
The balance of forces pulling on the CAP was shifting, making it difficult to defend the 
status quo politically. The prospects of EU enlargement to the east, to include countries 
with sizeable agricultural sectors with many social and economic difficulties, raised the 
issue of how the CAP would need to be adapted to meet this challenge. There was also 
explicit recognition of the international pressures for more trade liberalisation. A study 
written by an international team of experts (Buckwell Report 1997) set out a timetable 
for converting CAP into CARPE (Common Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe) in 
which the 'Rural' element was meant to be an 'integrated rural development policy', 
based on the principals of a 'bottom-up' approach. 
At the Cork Conference Commissioner Fischler talked about the need for a rural 
development policy that is truly integrated, not with a narrow sectoral focus on the 
agricultural industry; that is tailored to local needs and conditions that draws in a wide 
range of partners. Above all, the policy objective should be “sustainable and integrated 
rural development” (Fischler 1997). He aimed to draw together political and scientific 
groups to the benefit of underdeveloped regions, to put all reforming efforts into a 
unified system, and thus to establish a theoretical and professional background for the 
development of forthcoming reforms (The European Conference on Rural Development 
1996, Bálint et al 1999). 
The declaration from the Conference, although not agreed by all participants, pointed 
towards a much expanded rural development programme to embrace the whole farmed 
countryside rather than focusing on specific geographical zones. Many of the existing 
funds and schemes were to be brought together to simplify the plethora of policy 
mechanisms. Subsidiarity was seen as an important mechanism in achieving the 
objective of an integrated rural policy, with an emphasis on regional programming and 
greater transparency and participation. The Cork Declaration talks of “making a new 
start in rural development policy” (emphasis added) and sets out ten points that should 
guide the development of rural development policy. First, sustainable rural development 
must become the “fundamental principle” which underpins all rural policy. Second, rural 
development policy must be multi-sectoral with a clear territorial dimension. Third, 
support for diversification should enable private and community-based initiatives to 
become self-sustaining. Fourth, policies should promote rural development that sustains 
the quality and amenity of Europe’s rural, natural and cultural resources. Fifth, rural 
development policy must be “as decentralised as possible”, and emphasise participation 
and a ‘bottom-up approach’. Sixth, rural development policy and notably its agricultural 
component should be radically simplified. Seventh, there should be one single rural 
development programme for each region. Eighth, rural development policies should 
encourage the use of local financial resources. Ninth, the administrative capacity of local 
and regional governments and community groups should be enhanced. Tenth, 
programmes should be monitored and evaluated more strictly by stakeholders in the 
process. 
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Suggestions were made at the conference to reorganise the EU’s institutional and 
financial background, as well as to establish a separate budget and a Directorate 
especially designed for rural development. These proposals, however, were not included 
in the final document for political reasons.  
 
2.7. AGENDA 2000 AND THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT REGULATION (RDR) 
 
The Cork Declaration urged EU politicians to support the idea of integrated, sustainable 
rural development and put it into practice. The proposals, however, failed through the 
resistance of various political and economic forces. The Declaration was thus not 
endorsed by the Council of Agricultural Ministers and was sidelined by the EU Heads of 
State (Dwyer et al 2003). Nevertheless, ever since, the Commission’s rhetoric has 
frequently referred to the Cork principles in various policy papers and political 
declarations. Thus, the Commission’s Agenda 2000 reform proposals, issued in July 
1997, linked together proposals for changes to agricultural policy and the Structural 
Funds with the plans for the enlargement of the EU and the framework for the medium-
term budget for the Union. Substantial reorganisation of CAP funding mechanisms was 
proposed and a new emphasis was to be placed on simplification of rules and more 
decentralised application. Besides continuing with market and income support, a broad 
range of rural development and agri-environmental measures were to be introduced 
throughout the Union. To address these issues, the new RDR laid the foundations for a 
comprehensive and consistent rural development policy whose task will be to 
supplement market management by ensuring that agricultural expenditure is devoted 
more than in the past to spatial development and nature conservation (Commission, 
1997/1).  
March 1998 saw the publication of a set of detailed draft regulations to ‘put flesh’ on 
Agenda 2000. The draft RDR aroused considerable interest amongst commentators. 
Intended to establish an integrated legal framework for farm and rural development and 
agri-environment measures, its key features at the time were as follows (Dwyer et al 
2003): 
•  It was to be co-financed by the Guarantee (rather than the Guidance) Section of 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) which tradi-
tionally funded only the CAP market regimes
12.  
•  It was to be applied across the whole of the European Union. 
                                                 
12 This rearrangement of sources among EAGGF Guidance and Guarantee Funds may facilitate a 
change in program funding, administration and institutional background and anticipate a future 
expansion of integrated rural development (Lowe and Ward 1998). 
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•  European funds were to be allocated on the basis of multi-annual programmes 
prepared ‘at the most appropriate geographical level’ within Member States in a 
similar way to regional implementation of the Structural Funds.  
This represented a significant shift in emphasis and funding responsibilities to make 
rural development policy a more central feature of the CAP. Indeed, much was made of 
the fact that the proposals referred to rural development becoming the CAP’s ‘Second 
Pillar’.  
Although a novel departure, the draft Regulation was broadly derived from existing 
CAP measures, including: structural adjustment of the farming sector; support for farm-
ing in less favoured areas; remuneration for agri-environment activities; support for 
investments in processing and marketing; and forestry measures. Indeed, none of the sets 
of measures were entirely new. The broadest measures were those promoting ‘the 
adaptation and development of rural areas’ (Article 33 in the final Regulation) which 
were derived from aids previously offered from the Structural Funds under Objective 5b 
(1994-9). Article 33 appeared to broaden eligibility for CAP supports to include the 
prospect of non-farmers and non-agricultural activities having access to the RDR 
budget. In addition, the Regulation included two new measures: Article 16 offered 
compensation for ‘areas with environmental restrictions’ as an extension to the basic 
Less Favoured Area chapter, and Article 32 offered payments for the maintenance of 
forests of ecological value where they were otherwise uneconomic to manage, within the 
broader ‘forestry’ chapter (Dwyer et al 2003). 
Negotiations over CAP reform were concluded in March 1999 by Heads of Government 
in Berlin. They reduced the budget agreed earlier by the Agriculture Council and thus 
placed restrictive limits on Pillar 2 spending. The main CAP budget (EAGGF 
Guarantee) was limited to €40.5 billion per annum with only 10 per cent of this allocated 
to the RDR (EAGGF Guidance was to provide a further five per cent of total EAGGF 
funds for the RDR). Furthermore, Heads of Government disagreed as to how to stay 
within the agreed limit. Some accepted the principle of degressivity, reducing direct 
payments over time, and the Commission had tabled proposals along these lines (Agra 
Europe, Feb 1999). However, it proved difficult to agree a model that was acceptable to 
all Member States, because of differential impacts on each State’s share of the budget. In 
addition, a few States remained opposed to the very idea. Thus it was decided instead to 
limit expenditure by postponing reform of the dairy regime, reducing cereal price cuts 
and retaining set–aside.  
LEADER + (successor of the earlier LEADER initiatives) did not carry much promise 
for any significant reforms in rural development either. It remained a marginal policy. 
The allocated resources did not grow as significantly as in the previous stages
13. 
Moreover, it has become a horizontal policy, open for application for all rural regions
14, 
                                                 
13 A LEADER + annual budget is 2.02 billion Euro (Rural Europe). 
14 LEADER 1-2 were available for Objective 1, 6 and 5b areas only. 
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which further increased the competition for resources (Rural Europe Homepage). In 
addition, stricter rules further reduced the experimental and innovative nature of the 
programme. Requirements for LEADER associations also became stricter and more 
formal, making the establishment of new LAGs (LEADER Action Group) even more 
difficult. Moreover, the number of objectives eligible for support also decreased as the 
programme makers determined five priorities: to spread information technology; to 
improve living-conditions; to exploit natural and cultural resources; to improve 
opportunities for women and young people. At the same time the development of 
international networks was further facilitated by the fact that LAGs in different countries 
now have the opportunity to launch joint programmes. LEADER, therefore, essentially 
remained as it was before - an experimental programme with small budget on the 
periphery of agricultural and structural policies.  
The Agenda 2000 outcome was thus deeply compromised and must be judged a missed 
opportunity to transform the CAP (Tangermann, 1999). Effectively there was no ‘reform 
dividend’ at the EU level (i.e. no freeing up of funds from Pillar 1 to promote the 
integrated rural development agenda). While cohesion and a 'bottom-up', endogenous 
approach to development are set out as desirable objectives, Agenda 2000 puts rural 
development "in danger of becoming merely a branch of sectoral agricultural policy, or 
even agri-environmental policy" (Juvancic and Bryden 1998:10). However, crucial 
elements of national discretion were also incorporated into Agenda 2000 to reflect 
national and regional circumstances. Of particular relevance to the RDR was the option 
of using modulation to shift funds from the first to second Pillar, within each Member 
State (Lowe et al 2002, Falconer & Ward 2000).  
As a result of the evolution of development philosophies, references to cohesion and an 
endogenous (contrary to previous exogenous) approach to rural development became the 
main tone for policy documents and political speeches in the field of structural as well as 
agricultural policies. In reality, though, very little has changed compared to the time 
ruled by exogenous development philosophy (Bryden 2001). Mainstream policies still 
fail to recognise non-agricultural needs. The vast majority of resources - running counter 
to declared objectives of the EU's regional policy - are still allocated in order to promote 
industrial agricultural production and centrally organised exogenous development 
programmes
15 (Scott 1995). The main measure of backwardness is still the GDP (Wood 
1997). Even the success of community-based 'soft programmes' is usually measured 
through hard economic indicators like the number of jobs created or the expenditure 
generated. As it has been argued, "for the present, the dominant EC project is that of 
encouraging the centralisation of economic opportunity in the hands of the strongest 
players of the Community, if this helps to reinforce the EC as a global industrial power" 
(Amin and Tomaney 1995:14). According to Lowe et al (1997) the vast majority of 
                                                 
15 Almost one half of the budget of the EU still goes to 1.6 million large farmers. At the same time, a 
large part of the Structural Funds, with special regard to the ERDF, has been spent on infrastructural 
development of large conurbations, widening the gap between urban and rural areas. 
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EU’s policies rather serve the interests of international trade, EU budget, or various 
economic and political lobbies, than prevent underdeveloped regions from depopulation 
and lagging behind, or asserts ecological aspects. Therefore there is a basic, inherent 
contradiction between the objectives set in political statements and the programmes 
proposed for implementation. In short, while in socio-economic theories and on the 
rhetorical level of policy making there has been a clear paradigm shift from traditional 
modernisation towards an integrated rural development approach, in reality, policy, 
procedural and budgetary evidence prove that this paradigm shift in actual policy 
making has not taken place at all
16.  
 
2.8. WHAT IS 'RURAL DEVELOPMENT'? 
 
There is much confusion about what should be considered as rural development amongst 
EU policies. As I have explored above, there are several philosophies, with different 
types of actions and targeted populations, related to this label. The main reason for this 
is that rural development is a complex issue, involving different sectors and policies, 
such as agriculture, structural policies, social policies, community development and all 
sorts of local initiatives. In the late 1980s, when the failure of the previous productivist 
philosophy became obvious, rural development became a 'buzzword' - the progressive 
slogan for the future - and all sorts of different actions and policies were paraded as 
'rural development', sometimes in a very proprietorial fashion that sought to monopolise 
the concept. The following is not an attempt to provide a detailed analysis of this 
question, but rather an endeavour to clarify the use of the term for the current study, to 
avoid subsequent confusion. 
Recently the most frequent user of the expression 'rural development' in policy 
documents, press releases and speeches is the agricultural bureaucracy. Within the EU 
this means the Directorate General for Agriculture (DG Agri/DGVI) exemplified 
through the Rural Development Regulation within the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP RDR). The basis of their claim on the term is that agriculture is the largest user of 
the land in rural areas, and traditionally it used to be the main field for economic 
activities. In DG Agri's current practice, according to their overwhelming philosophy, 
'rural development' means those instruments of agricultural policy, which are different 
from the traditional 'market support type' instruments of the CAP. These policies are 
primarily aimed still at the structural transformation of agricultural production, including 
considerations of environmental sustainability. Their actions are targeted primarily at 
farmers, and their operations mostly remain within the agricultural sector. This type of 
policy will be referred to as agricultural structural policies.  
                                                 
16 This becomes even more apparent in connection with the eastern enlargement, namely through the 
examination of policies offered for pre-accession preparation and the first years of EU membership for 
the CEE countries.  
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Since the reforms of 1988, DG Regio has managed most resources for spatial 
restructuring, social and economic cohesion within the EU, paid for through the 
Structural and the Cohesion Funds. The main aim of this spending has been to help 
those regions that are lagging behind the average of the Community. Many of these 
regions are rural in character and in such cases Structural Fund interventions represent a 
form of rural development. The bulk of the money under these policies has been spent 
under Objective 1, in large designated areas. The main innovation of these policies is 
their  spatial concentration, contrary to the former sectoral  approach. However, the 
majority of the improvements gained do not meet the criteria of ‘rural development’ for 
two reasons: The main activity has been targeted on large infrastructural investments, 
the major expenditures being devoted to urban centres and to inter-urban connections, 
rather than in rural areas; and these programmes belong to the types of mammoth 
enterprises with huge budget from which small-scale local projects at most can benefit 
only indirectly through the generally improved wealth of the economic environment. 
These types of policies will be referred to as regional development. 
Programmes in 5b areas under the pre-Agenda 2000 structural policies were established 
on a different basis. These programmes were financed and managed by the Directorate 
of Agriculture (DGVI), thus their primary aim remained agricultural modernisation. 
Even so, they had a clear territorial approach, supplemented with a notion of integrating 
various policy instruments and generating local participation, in order to achieve socio-
economic improvement in the designated areas. Theoretically, there was more space for 
subsidiarity, partnership, participation and local initiatives. The target areas were usually 
much smaller (NUTS
17 3 level generally) and therefore more appropriate for the 
treatment of special local problems. Local partnerships were involved in programme de-
sign and implementation, and besides agricultural measures, training and infrastructure 
was also supported. Nevertheless, rural economy was still understood in an agricultural 
framework, and non-agricultural problems were treated as inferior. This type of 
development hereinafter will be called agrarian rural development. 
In 1991 the LEADER programme commenced as an experiment with the central idea of 
generating and testing ideas, gaining experience and knowledge about a 'bottom-up' rural 
development approach in European contexts. This approach raised a new paradigm, 
representing a complete change from previously centralised and 'top-down' structures. 
Its main characteristics are partnership, subsidiarity, accountability and transparency at a 
local level and the support of local initiatives and innovations. The objective of the 
programme is to support the local population of a small region to realise and implement 
its own ideas for the future by relying on internal resources. This type of approach will 
be called as bottom-up-type rural development. 
Integrated rural development does not exist in the form of a well-defined programme in 
the EU’s policy practice, though many documents and political speeches refer to it (most 
importantly AGENDA 2000). Nevertheless, there are a number of practical examples, 
                                                 
17 Spatial statistical classification of the EU. 
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where internal and external resources, local and global aims and actors, endogenous and 
exogenous development methods accomplished significant improvements in 
underdeveloped rural areas of Europe. These can be understood manifestations of the 
emerging new rural development paradigm, claimed by a number of authors. In the rest 
of this study, integrated rural development will be used as an expression to embrace 
existing practices, institutional arrangements and a general approach, complying with 
the formulating new paradigm. 
 
3. ENLARGEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT – THE WAY FORWARD FOR 
RURAL EUROPE? 
 
The coming eastern enlargement brings a larger area, more countries and more people 
into the EU than any of the previous enlargements and is most likely to lead to 
significant changes. It will increase regional differences and inequalities, but it will also 
enrich human and natural resources, cultural and economic diversity - features expected 
to have positive effects on the future of the whole of Europe. According to the guiding 
principles of the European Treaties, cultural and natural diversity should be coupled 
with economic and social cohesion. Presumably, the most difficult challenge for post-
accession EU policies will be to keep this objective and to face the problems caused by 
the large backward rural areas and the poor populations of the newly joined countries. 
Previous enlargements (e.g. the Southern enlargement) have contributed to the evolution 
of EU policies, as additional demands in the interests of new member states had to be 
included. Likewise, Eastern enlargement is likely to bring about significant changes in 
policy making. Considering that many of the expected problems are rooted in rural areas 
- particularly poverty and a need for modernisation - the largest challenge should be 
expected in the field of rural, cohesion and development policies.  As a result, this 
enlargement could potentially pave the way for a qualitative shift in EU rural 
development policies
18.  
According to Stone (1999), the development of new policies often goes from the 
particular to the general. In other words, within a state (or a supranational organisation), 
new policies are often designed to remedy problems in a particular geographical area. 
Then a modified version of the policy can be transferred to other areas and become a 
core policy. Presumably, if during the pre-accession period and/or the first transitional 
                                                 
18 The recent round of WTO negotiations, started in October 2000, can be considered as another 
important outside force for change. The CAP, especially the compensation payments and the market 
support measures, is likely to be challenged by other WTO members, raising the significance of agri-
environmental and rural development instruments. This suggests similar direction for the evolution of 
EU rural policies to the Eastern enlargement, supporting an integrated approach. However, other signs, 
such as the Blair House Agreement signed by the EU and the USA in November 1992 during the Uru-
guay Round of the WTO negotiations suggest that traditional, protectionist agricultural policies might 
survive for a longer future.  
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years of membership, endogenous rural development policies gained significance in 
CEE, it could generate changes in EU rural policies as a whole. All in all, eastern 
enlargement and the EU’s approach towards the connected preparation could be 
understood as a good indicator of future trends of EU rural and agricultural policies.  
For a variety of reasons, CEE countries, becoming New Member States, could provide a 
good field for initiating a paradigm shift in EU rural policy making (Nemes 1999).  
First, after twelve years of transition, CEE economy and society is still in continuous 
change. Innovations, therefore, should be easier to find and introduce than in more 
settled countries. Also, these countries, and especially their rural areas, are in need of 
external resources and are thus receptive to help and strategies coming from outside.  
Second, the bulk of CEE agriculture is liberalised; former socialist-type co-operatives 
have been 'rationalised' or turned into capitalist companies; land and other assets of 
production have been privatised. Nevertheless, most of CEE agriculture is in a desperate 
need of capital and modernisation. It represents an important and influential part of the 
economy in most CEECs. Nevertheless, farming sectors in recent years have not been as 
heavily subsidised as in the EU. Production is generally less intensive, therefore agri-
environmental damage is less significant than in Western Europe.  
Third, generally, rurality has a quite different view in CEE compared to Western 
Europe. Due to historic and economic factors (collectivisation, lack of capital, etc.) 
agriculture has never been intensified or specialised to a Western level. Self-subsistence 
and local markets are still very significant in food production and consumption.  
Fourth, as a consequence of industrial commuting in the past, pluriactivity is a well-
known phenomenon for most rural people. The rural population is larger and due to the 
lack of counter-urbanisation more homogenous and more 'local', having more social 
networks and traditions. In general, rural economy and society of the CEECs can be seen 
as more traditional, or closer to a peasant stage, than the one in the West. 
Differences between Eastern and Western European rurality can be seen from various 
angles. Examining the situation from the viewpoint of the modernisation paradigm, CEE 
rurality (including its agriculture) is poor, backward and underdeveloped
19. If it is due to 
follow the ‘modernisation route’, then decades and billions of Euros will be needed to 
catch up with the rest of the EU. Additionally, the many failures of modernisation-based 
EU rural and agricultural policies over the past 50 years – i.e. causing environmental 
damage, depopulation, growing regional differences and so on - are likely to be repeated 
in CEE. On the other hand, differences between East and West can also be seen as 
results of different development trajectories. From this point of view CEE areas did not 
go on the same modernisation route, but took an alternative direction to western 
development. If EU rural policies evolve in a more integrated, endogenous direction 
(realising the new paradigm), then having a more traditional rural economy and society 
                                                 
19 A few competitive sectors and geographic areas - such as some arable farms in Slovakia and Hungary 
or some modernised diary farms in Poland - should be mentioned as exceptions. 
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may not turn out to be a drawback after all, but an advantage for CEECs. Nevertheless, a 
forced, hasty modernisation and growing rural development problems can soon result in 
the diminution of such advantages. 
Designing rural policies for applicant countries and Member States for the pre-accession 
period, EU policy makers had to make a strategic choice between aiming to maintain the 
present system or using the opportunity of enlargement to initiate significant changes in 
the field of rural policies. In the original Agenda 2000, as well as in the preliminary 
versions of the Pre-accession Measures, final decisions were not made on these issues 
and several doors were left open for future discussion. Moreover, even after the 
finalisation of legislation one could still have some ambiguities about the intentions and 
possible outcomes. Strategic trends, directions and intentions beyond political 
documents and moves of institutional systems and bureaucracies are often not easy to 
identify. Power structures are interconnected and decisions often depend on political 
factors, rather than rational considerations. However, examining the process of the 
development of documents, legislation and institutions might help to highlight strategic 
trends and to gain a better understanding of the whole issue.  
This section explores the EU pre-accession preparation - with special regard to the 
SAPARD
20 Programme. I try to identify the main trends of the EU approach towards the 
eastern enlargement and rural development - based on legislative documents; political 
declarations and interviews conducted in Brussels during the past five years. The main 
aim of the analysis is to identify the original intentions of the policy makers and to judge 
whether SAPARD have ever had the potential to become a significant step on the way of 
developing a new rural policy for Europe or not.  
We analyse the final SAPARD Regulation (Commission 1999/2), comparing it to its 
earlier draft version (Commission 1998/1) and to the CAP RDR (Commission 1999/3). 
The amending regulation on the management of SAPARD (Commission 1999/4) and a 
Vademecum on co-ordination of the three financial pre-accession instruments 
(Commission 2000/2), which intended to help the preparation of candidate countries are 
also included in the analysis. These documents are from the very early days of the 
process and at this stage I do not intend to talk about further developments, such as 
negotiations between the EU and CEECs, or the difficulties of implementing SAPARD.  
 
                                                 
20 SAPARD - - Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development  
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3.1. THE EU PRE-ACCESSION INSTRUMENTS 
 
The main aim of pre-accession policies has been to help applicant countries' adoption of 
the acquis communautaire and to prepare them for future EU policies. EU assistance can 
only support those objectives and actions, which are in accordance with these aims. For 
the pre-accession period PHARE 2000+ - a significantly reformed version of the former 
PHARE Programme - and two new financial instruments were set up: the ISPA (pre-
accession structural instrument) and SAPARD. The overall annual budget for these is 
EURO 3120 million, which has been allocated between the applicant countries, 
programme by programme, according to objective criteria (Commission 2000/2).  
PHARE 2000+, with half of the overall budget (EURO 1560), represents the main 
instrument for pre-accession. It focuses on two main priorities, institution building and 
investment. PHARE support for institution building helps the candidate countries to 
implement the acquis and to prepare for participation in EU policies. Investment support 
focuses on strengthening the regulatory infrastructure needed to ensure compliance with 
the  acquis  and direct acquis-related investments. Furthermore, PHARE supports 
investment in economic and social cohesion through measures similar to those supported 
in Member States through the ERDF and ESF. PHARE may also support measures in 
the fields of environment, transport, agricultural and rural development, but only if they 
form an ‘incidental but indispensable part of integrated industrial reconstruction or 
regional development programmes’. However, this latter type of support is not 
horizontal, but restricted to priority regions in each of the applicant countries 
(Commission 1999/4). Within the PHARE budget there is an indicative split 30/70% 
between institution building and investment, and eligible investment projects must be for 
a minimum of 2M Euros. PHARE remains a project-based programme, controlled quite 
tightly from Brussels. A Financing Memorandum has to be signed yearly with each 
applicant country. 
ISPA represents one third of the pre-accession budget (1040 million EURO). In terms of 
the type of the eligible measures, it is similar to the European Regional Development 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund and it is be administered by the DG for Regional Policy. Its 
main objective is to contribute to the preparation of the applicant countries in the area of 
economic and social cohesion through a contribution to transport infrastructure networks 
and environmental protection. For transport it mainly supports the extension of the Trans 
European Networks, which means building motorways and international train lines. For 
environment the main objective is to ensure compliance with Community environmental 
law. This mainly supports investments aiming at the reduction of air pollution and the 
modernisation of large-scale sewage and municipal waste treatment. The budget should 
be shared equally between transport and environmental objectives. The total cost of each 
project should be at least 5 million EURO. The programme is controlled from Brussels, 
financial decisions on projects, proposed by the applicant countries, are made by the 
Commission several times a year.  
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SAPARD represents one sixth of the yearly pre-accession budget (M520 EURO). The 
programme is parallel with the Rural Development Chapter of CAP and the money is to 
be administered by the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guarantee and 
Guidance Fund. Its main aims are to prepare CEE rural areas for EU agricultural and 
rural development policies and for specific mechanisms of the Structural Funds. 
Applicant countries could choose from a list of 15 measures to prepare their domestic 
programmes. There is no minimum cost threshold for a measure. Unlike for the other 
two instruments, the control of the programme should be decentralised and decisions 
made by accredited implementing agencies in each country.  
In order to achieve optimal economic impact of the operations supported under the three 
instruments, there is a need to ensure co-ordination and complementarity between these 
instruments within the framework of the Accession Partnerships. The programming and 
implementing rules for pre-accession assistance are laid down in the ISPA and SAPARD 
regulations, in the Co-ordinating Regulation and in the new PHARE Guidelines 
(Commission 1999/2, 4, 5 and 7). Guidance on other issues - such as eligible actions, co-
ordination in programming, implementation procedures, co-financing, conditionality, the 
role of the Delegations, reporting, evaluation, monitoring and internal co-ordination - is 
set out in a Vademecum, produced by DG Enlargement (Commission 2000/2). 
As a prerequisite for participating in the pre-accession programmes, applicant countries 
had to build institutions and produce a range of strategic programming documents. The 
revised Accession Partnerships, complemented by National Programmes for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), provide the framework for the multi-annual 
programming of the three pre-accession instruments. Preliminary National Development 
Plans (PNDP), prepared by each country, had to be attached to the NPAAs. They had to 
include analysis of the country's current situation and identification of the critical 
development gaps and the key development priorities
21. Rural Development Plans, 
covering a seven-year period, also had to be produced, in order to be able to participate 
in SAPARD. 
 
3.2. THE SAPARD REGULATION 
 
The idea of a pre-accession measure particularly for agriculture and rural development 
first appeared in Agenda 2000, and a draft version was launched for CEE countries
22, as 
well as Malta and Cyprus by the Luxembourg Council in December 1997. The final 
document (Commission 1999/2) was accepted after the Berlin Summit, in June 1999. 
Details on implementation and the financial management of the programme were 
published in December 1999 and January 2000 (Commission 1999/4, Commission 
                                                 
21 These should be the predecessors of the future objective 1 community support frameworks. 
22 These are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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2000/1). There follows a short analysis of the regulation, drawing upon some telling 
similarities and differences with the Rural Development Regulation under the reformed 
CAP (CAP RDR), and some important changes in the final document compared to the 
draft version of the SAPARD regulation. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
As quoted from the legislation: 
"This regulation establishes the framework for Community support for sus-
tainable agriculture and sustainable rural development for the pre-accession 
period..." (Commission 1999/2 Preamble) 
This statement refers to both agriculture and wider rural development. The Preamble of 
the document explains the scope of what is intended: 
"...pre-accession aid for agriculture should follow the priorities of the re-
formed CAP; whereas such aid should be applied to priority areas to be de-
fined for each country, such as the improvement of structures for processing 
agricultural and fishery products, distribution, quality control of food as well 
as veterinary and plant-health controls and the setting up of producer groups; 
whereas it should also be possible to finance integrated rural development 
projects to support local initiatives and agri-environmental measures, to im-
prove the efficiency of farms, to adapt infrastructure as well as measures 
which will accelerate structural reconversion..." (Commission 1999/2 Pream-
ble). 
This paragraph sets out the main aims for programmes to be supported. It also gives 
working definitions for the development of agriculture and for 'integrated rural 
development'. Concerning agriculture the scope of the regulation is clearly stated and 
restricted to agricultural structural policies. Concerning rural development the statement 
is both tentative (“it should be possible”) and ambiguous. Throughout the whole 
document it remains uncertain if the aforementioned local initiatives, adaptation of 
infrastructure or the structural reconversion is limited to the agri-food sector or 
represents a wider approach to rural development.  
The two main specific objectives are the following: 
"a. contributing to the implementation of the acquis communautaire concern-
ing the common agricultural policy and related policies; 
 b. solving priority and specific problems for the sustainable adaptation of the 
agricultural sector and rural areas in the applicant countries." (Commission 
1999/2, Article 1). 
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According to the first objective the aim of SAPARD is to prepare applicant countries for 
the Common Agricultural Policy. However, at the time of the publication of this 
document (1999), the new eastern member states were to be excluded from 
compensation payments completely. CEE countries therefore were not being prepared 
for the direct payments - the major part of the First Pillar of the CAP. Instead, they were 
to be prepared for the Rural Development Chapter of the CAP, which remains a 
peripheral policy, representing one tenth of the total agricultural budget (Lowe and 
Brouwer 2000).  
CEEC agriculture and rural areas would nevertheless have to compete and survive 
within the Common Market for agricultural products. In preparation, therefore, the 
second objective intends to solve priority problems in agriculture and rural areas of the 
applicant countries. This could leave a wide scope for subsidiarity, however, later on the 
document sets out what the priorities should be: 
"...applicant countries shall ensure that priority is given to measures to im-
prove market efficiency, quality and health standards, and measures to create 
new employment in rural areas, in compliance with the provisions on the pro-
tection of the environment." (Article 4/3) 
There is a small but significant change in the final document, compared to the draft vers-
ion. Originally the order (which implied a priority order, according to interviews with 
EU officials) of these two objectives was the other way around. At first, preparing rural 
economy and society for EU membership, solving at least some of the priority problems 
before accession, was the number one priority. Later it was replaced with the general 
preparation for the agricultural acquis communautaire, practically involving mainly the 




The list of the 15 eligible measures, as with those in the CAP RDR, is not compulsory. 
According to the principle of subsidiarity it only offers a menu, from which the 
applicant countries can create their own programme. However, the list is strongly 
orientated towards agricultural restructuring. The large majority of the fifteen measures 
are directly connected to land-based activities.  
The list of measures in SAPARD, in fact, is strongly based on the list under the CAP 
Rural Development Regulation (see Table 1. below for the measures) However, there are 
significant differences. The scope of SAPARD is somewhat narrower, some measures 
are totally missing and others are less pronounced or less defined. On the other hand, 
there are a couple of new measures in the field of agriculture and administration, 
specially designed for CEE problems. Also, some measures in the area of rural 
development give more space for integrating non-agricultural parts of the economy and 
society.  
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One of the major differences is about environmental protection. This is very important 
in the CAP RDR, representing a significant proportion of the budget and a range of 
measures in the programme
23 (Lowe and Brouwer 2000). In SAPARD the 
environmental perspective is present, but much less pronounced. There is no mention of 
LFAs and a wide range of agri-environmental measures and specially allocated money 
for environmental  
 




inv. agric. holdings art 4 art 2
young farmers art 8
vocational training art 9 art 2
early retirement art 10
LFA/AER art 14, 16
agri-environment art 22 art 2
marketing and proc. art 25 art 2
afforestation art 31
other forestry art 30, 32
land improvement art 33
reparcelling art 33
farm relief/management services art 33 art 2
marketing of quality ag. products art 33
basic services rural economy art 33
renovation villages art 33 art 2
diversification of agric. activities art 33 art 2
ag water resources management art 33 art 2
development agric. infrastructure art 33 art 2
tourism/crafts art 33
protection of the environment art 33
restoring ag. prod. potential art 33
financial engineering art 33
control structures quality, veterinary art 2
setting up producer groups art 2
land registers art 2
technical assistance art 2





























protection in agricultural rural areas are missing. There is only one measure promoting 
"agricultural production methods designed to protect the environment and maintain the 
countryside" (Commission 1999/2 Article 2). This is almost the same as the agri-
environmental measure that used to be in the CAP before Agenda 2000. However, 
environmental protection has gained new importance after the reforms - a change not 
recognised by SAPARD.  
 
                                                 
23 The most important are the support for LFAs and the Agri-environmental measures (this is the only 
measure which is compulsory for every EU countries). However, even under Article 33 there is a 
measure for environmental protection.  
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In the field of human resource management only vocational training can be supported by 
SAPARD. Neither early retirement nor the setting up of young farmers can be 
subsidised. However, contrary to the CAP, vocational training is not restricted to 
agriculture by the legislation.  
Most measures of SAPARD are based on the measures listed in Article 33 (measures for 
the general development of rural areas) of the CAP RDR. The most telling difference 
between the two lists is represented by those rural development measures that are 
missing from SAPARD
24: 
•  marketing of quality agricultural products; 
•  basic services for rural economies and populations; 
•  promotion of tourism and crafts; 
These objectives could have been used to support endogenous development, providing 
economic activities and possible income outside of agriculture. Rural tourism (and 
crafts, producing quality local products to sell them to the tourists) is probably the most 
widespread non-agricultural economic activity in Western European countries and it 
constitutes the basis of a range of EU rural development programmes. The development 
of basic services is essential for any sufficient local economic development. The support 
for the marketing of quality products could fuel local development through reinforcing 
traditions, finding and grasping niche markets as well as broader EU markets for unique 
products of central European rurality. The lack of these measures means that any direct 
reference to non-agricultural economic activities is entirely absent from the SAPARD 
Programme. This implies that the rural economy is treated as equivalent to agriculture in 
this policy (all this, it should be borne in mind, in a broader policy context in which CEE 
agriculture within the EU will be systematically discriminated against).  
The two additional measures in SAPARD, compared to the CAP RDR, are designed for 
special CEE problems and they are to support the restructuring of administration and the 
production system inside agriculture. Without the "establishment and updating of land 
registers" (which are missing or not appropriate in many CEE countries) it would be al-
most impossible to apply any central, administrative control on agricultural policies. 
Also, the support for "setting up production groups" is essential to restructure CEE 
production systems in a more Euro-compliant way. 
 
FINANCES 
                                                 
24 Two agricultural measures are also missing, these are: "restoring the potential of agricultural 
production following damage by natural disasters and introducing appropriate preventive measures; 
and financial engineering".  
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The total budget of SAPARD is EURO 520 million/year for the ten CEE countries. 
Although the CAP RDR is often accused of not having sufficient resources to give 
enough support to rural development, the budget for SAPARD is way below even that. 
The maximum amount of available resources for CEE countries to prepare their rurality 
for accession is just over 10 % of the CAP RDR budget. The indicative budget 
allocations among the applicant countries were laid down by the Commission in July 
1999, based on objective criteria
25 (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Allocation of SAPARD resources amongst applicant countries  
(Million Euro/annum) 
 
Bulgaria Czech   Estonia  Hungary Lithuania  Latvia  Poland  Romania  Slovene  Slovakia 
52.124 22.063  12.137 38.054 29.829  21.848  168.683  150.636 6.337  18.289 
 (Commission 1999/6) 
CEE countries are eligible for this aid annually until 2006 or their accession whichever 
is the earliest. Since CEECs are third countries, the EU had to make bilateral financial 
agreements (multi-annual and annual) with each of them. The money is administered 
under the EAGGF Guarantee section. This means that applicant countries have to fulfil 
the particularly strict rules of the agricultural budget on payments and accounting, which 
has implications for the way the programmes can be administered.  
According to the regulation, the Commission required each CEEC to set up a SAPARD 
paying and implementing agency. The agency had to be accredited by the competent 
national authority, the National Fund
26, and the Commission verified accreditation on 
the spot. Once this was done, and the Commission adopted the National Rural 
Development Programme, the first annual Financial Memorandum could be signed and 
Community financing was transferred to the National Fund. The National Fund was to 
act as the sole go-between for financial transfers and communication of the Commission 
and the Paying Agency in every country. This meant that all management tasks from the 
project selection stage to payments to final beneficiaries were devolved from the 
Commission to the CEE countries (Commission 2000/2). This was an advance on the 
administrative system of PHARE, in which basically everything had to be approved by 
Brussels. The new devolved system was intended to be simpler and quicker, and it can 
be seen as essential from the viewpoint of institution building and preparation for the 
principles and procedures of the EAGGF Guarantee Section, which gives Member States 
full responsibility for management. However, subsidiarity and the scope for 
decentralised administration stopped strictly at the central governmental level of 
applicant countries, to ensure transparency and accountability. 
                                                 
25 Size of the agricultural population; total agricultural area; per capita GDP, based on purchasing 
power parity; specific situation of rural areas. 
26 This was set up in every CEE country for the administration of the PHARE programme. 
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FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION 
Two subsequent documents provided some more information on SAPARD, concerning 
eligible measures and actions and the importance of integrated rural development within 
the programme. One was the legislation on the implementation of the programme 
(Commission 1999/5). The other one was a Vademecum on the co-ordination of the pre-
accession instruments
27 (Commission 2000/2), containing a list of those activities which 
can be supported under SAPARD and PHARE. These subsequent documents resolved 
some ambiguities of the main SAPARD Regulation.  
The regulation on the implementation of SAPARD (Commission 1999/4) greatly 
reinforces its connection with the CAP RDR saying: 
"...as a general principle, support shall be granted according to the rules in 
force for Community rural development support, and, in particular, according 
to the main objectives and instruments laid down in... (the CAP RDR and the 
legislation on its implementation)" (Preamble/3) 
It also says that: 
"...particular measures referred to in Article 2 (of the SAPARD Regulation) 
are similar to measures referred to (in the CAP RDR) and should therefore be 
implemented by the applicant countries as far as possible in accordance with 
the principles for implementing those measures in the Community" (Pream-
ble/4) 
After this (continuously referring back to the CAP RDR) the document focuses on a few 
measures that are new or somewhat different in SAPARD; although, it does not explain 
all the differences.  
Most measures discussed by the document are agricultural.  The legislation gives the 
possibility of some delay to fulfil environmental and health standards to farmers 
applying for agricultural investment subsidies. It excludes the retail level from the 
measure on 'processing and marketing of agricultural products'. It also makes implicit 
that producers must get "an adequate share in the resulting economic benefits" 
(Commission 1999/3 Article 26). According to the document, the agri-environmental 
measure should not be implemented horizontally, but at a pilot level, creating a limited 
number of complex projects. The document gives details about the measure on 'setting 
up producer groups', emphasising that the support only covers administrative and 
legislative costs. Finally it makes some restrictions concerning 'afforestation and the 
processing and marketing of forestry products' compared to the CAP RDR. 
                                                 
27 This is an explanatory document, produced by DG Enlargement in January 2000, linking to the 
Community legislation on the co-ordination of the pre-accession instruments. 
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The only rural development measure appearing in the legislation is 'vocational training'. 
Besides, even what is said about this is in contradiction with the list of eligible actions in 
the Vademecum, mentioned above. According to the legislation, training should be 
restricted to farming and forestry
28, with the exclusion of "normal programmes or 
systems of agricultural and forestry education at secondary or higher levels" (Article 5-
6). At the same time in the Vademecum 'training on local development management' and 
'other vocational training' are listed as eligible activities.  
The rest of the rural development measures do not appear in the implementing 
legislation. This is in spite of the fact that two of them – relating to infrastructure and 
diversification - are restricted to agriculture in the CAP RDR, but not through SAPARD. 
Nevertheless, according to the Vademecum, in CEE these measures can be understood in 
a broader rural development sense than in the EU under the RDR. In the list of eligible 
actions for the development of rural infrastructure, for example, roads, drinking water, 
energy systems, telecommunication and other infrastructural investments appear 
amongst others. However, these objectives can be co-financed by PHARE, and it is not 
absolutely clear from the documents what will be the division between the two 
instruments. All we know is that PHARE support should focus "on business related 
infrastructure in the context of regional development plans in priority regions". It can 
even mean that under SAPARD still only agriculturally related infrastructure should be 
eligible for support and others should be supported from PHARE. In this case 'other 
rural infrastructure' would be excluded from the Rural Development Programmes, would 
be subject to totally different procedures than under SAPARD and would be restricted to 
some priority regions in each applicant country. There is a similar ambiguity about the 
development of tourism and ‘arts and crafts’. While in the CAP RDR they have separate 
measures, in the SAPARD regulation there is no mention of them. In the Vademecum 
'tourism infrastructure, other tourism activities and craft activities' are listed under the 
measure for rural diversification. However, these measures are also co-financed by 
PHARE, without a clear distinction for eligibility criteria.  
 
4. A STEP FORWARD OR BACK - SOME CONCLUSIONS - PRE-ACCESSION 
POLICIES, COERCIVE TRANSFER AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE ‘OLD 
PARADIGM’ 
 
EU policy makers have not used the possibility offered by Eastern Enlargement to 
change the ruling productivist paradigm in the field of agricultural and rural policies. 
They have rather chosen to maintain and reinforce the present system. Agenda 2000 and 
the concluding reforms are likely to remain a 'wasted opportunity' (Lowe and Brouwer 
2000). One could say that the pre-accession strategy concentrates mainly on political and 
economic cohesion. It supports almost exclusively such objectives that can be justified 
                                                 
28 This is simply taken from the CAP RDR. 
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with short to mid-term political and economic interests and it is designed in a very much 
centralised, exogenous manner. Social cohesion, the reinforcement of local economy and 
society, indeed the general aims of an endogenous, integrated approach to rural 
development are almost totally lacking. Therefore, according to the present prospects, 
SAPARD - and eastern enlargement in general - could even turn out to be a step 
backwards, rather than forwards, in the evolution of EU rural policies.  
The analysed SAPARD Regulation does not go beyond the CAP RDR, on the contrary, 
it is a watered down version of the latter. The financial resources offered are 
insignificant compared to the task of restructuring CEE rurality, preparing it for EU 
membership
29. In every step of the policy making process (from the draft to the final 
version and throughout the subsequent documents on finance, implementation and co-
ordination) the focus of SAPARD was increasingly narrowed down to agricultural 
restructuring, losing the scope of a wider rural development perspective. Administration 
and programming were devolved from the EU to the applicants, but on the country level 
a centralised system of institutions and administration had to be built. Rural 
Development Programmes were due to be written by the CEECs. However, through the 
list of eligible activities, the programming and evaluation process and the financial rules 
of the EAGGF Guarantee Section, a potentially very strict control by Brussels could be 
foreseen already before the launch of the programme. Existing EU policies and 
approaches, alternative to the ruling policy paradigm, are lacking from proposals to 
Central Europe. The lack of the LEADER approach from the official pre-accession 
strategy can be examined from this angle. The results of an experimental, broadly 
defined and controlled policy could well support the argument for measures, specially 
designed for the Central European problems. Furthermore, the spread of such an 
approach would mean the reinforcement of localities of the applicant countries and their 
connection with a growing European-wide network and the soft transfer of alternative 
development ideas. Such an evolution would be dysfunctional to the prevailing 
paradigm. 
The process of eastern enlargement, as it was proposed in the Agenda 2000 and the pre-
accession measures, is dominated by hard or coercive policy transfers. Moreover, most 
of these are direct or indirect coercive policy transfers, pushed by the EU and accepted 
by the applicant countries. Health, market or safety regulations are examples of direct 
coercive transfer - the acquis communautaire, which is required to be accepted and 
implemented by future Member States, includes many examples of transfers of this sort. 
Different subsidies and aids provided or promised by the EU can be classified as indirect 
coercive transfers. This money can only be spent to achieve objectives defined by the 
EU. Applicants need to build EU-compliant institutions and procedures to be able to 
access the money. Moreover, the requirement of additionality ties even domestic 
                                                 
29 As a telling comparison, Austria alone - with its 0.4 million rural inhabitants and its 250 thousand 
agro/forestry workers - receives almost twice as much from the RDR budget, than all the ten CEE 
countries from SAPARD. 
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resources to EU objectives and procedures
30. Implementation is monitored, evaluated 
and controlled by the EU and the whole process is driven from the centre. The primary 
objective seems to be building a strong, Euro-compliant bureaucracy on a central or 
governmental level, which will be able to work with the complicated official system of 
the EU in the near future. This well matches the process, described by Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996) when policy transfer, instead of introducing new ideas, simply reinforces 
the existing system, maintaining the status quo. 
There is a general agreement in the literature that the lack of complexity of a policy is 
crucial for its transferability. Differences in economy and political culture are also 
considered to be of primary importance. In the light of these factors, one can have 
doubts about the transferability of the CAP or the Structural Policies. They are highly 
complicated, even after the simplifying reform of the Agenda 2000, according to every 
component of complexity, suggested by Rose (1993), for example. They have multiple 
objectives; try to tackle different aspects of complicated social, economic and 
environmental matters; expect to have diverse effects; and are usually difficult to 
evaluate. They were designed to suit the needs of countries with significantly different 
social-economic circumstances and political cultures, compared to the Future Member 
States.  
After the southern enlargement of the EU a major policy reform was undertaken, a 
whole new set of institutions and measures was created and added to the old system. It 
was not a simple extension (or coercive transfer) of existing policies to the New Member 
States, since the design of new policies was based on pilot schemes, run in the applicant 
countries, i.e. a process of social learning. Nevertheless, there are serious criticisms 
about the social, economic and environmental effects of Structural and Cohesion 
policies in the Mediterranean Countries (Scott 1995, Syrett 1995). Compared to this, in 
the Agenda 2000 there is no intention to introduce anything like a significant parallel 
structure of policies designed to the special needs of the Central European Countries. 
Existing policies are simply imposed on the New Member States, without any significant 
modification. What are the prospects of a coercive policy transfer, described here, NOT 
to end up in policy failures and anomalies? According to this analysis, the current 
eastern enlargement is more likely to set back the reform of EU rural policies than to 
accelerate it. 
Above, in connection with Agenda 2000 I identified an inherent contradiction between 
the rhetoric and policy practice of the EU. As the analysis showed here, this 
contradiction has been reproduced in the pre-accession policies especially concerning 
SAPARD.  Nevertheless, besides hard policy transfers dominated by modernisation, a 
continuous flow of information and positive examples on the ‘new paradigm’ - in other 
                                                 
30 According to PHARE regulations, for example, if a sub-project, within a single programme, has any 
proportion of EU funding in its budget, then EU financial regulations and procedures have to be 
applied to all its expenses. Therefore even their own money has to be spent through EU conform 
procedures (tendering, monitoring, accounting, etc.).  
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words a soft policy transfer – can also be encountered. This originates from the EU and 
results in a clear process of social learning in CEE rural areas and policy-making. A 
main source of this is the rural development rhetoric of the EU and certain requirements 
(programming, social dialogue, partnership working, etc.) set as pre-requisites to EU aid. 
The other important source comes from the positive example of the LEADER 
Programme and some other measures in the EU policy system. These parallel influences 
and their effects on CEE rurality can also be an interesting subject of analysis. 
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